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PROBLEMS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT IN MODERN
TIMES
Throughout the academic year 1955-56 Marquette University has been celebrating its 75th
Anniversary. A number of scholarly discussions
have been presented by the University to carry
out the theme of the celebration--"The Pursuit of
Truth to Make Men Free."
A program of this sort was sponsored on November 14, 1955 by the Marquette University Law
School. In an effort to dispel some of the confusion and misunderstanding surrounding the use of
the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination provision
three scholars were invited to give addresses on the
topic "The Problem of the Fifth Amendment in
Modem Times." Reverend John R. Connery, S.J.
was requested to clarify the moral aspects of the
problem Dean Erwin N. Griswold and C. Dickerman Williams were asked to present somewhat
contrasting legal viewpoints.
The lectures are reproduced just as they were
given in the three articles which follow this introduction.
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A few years back the press carried the story of an Italian missionary priest in China who mutilated his tongue to avoid betraying his
Christian flock into the hands of his Communist accusers. Whatever
value judgment one may pass on this act of heroic courage, it was
obviously an attempt to protect a right to silence which the priest
feared might otherwise be violated. The right to silence is the subject
of vicious attack in the Communist world today. Communism recognizes no such right. No man's thoughts are his own, no man's secrets
are inviolate in the world of Communism. Just as a man's material
goods are common, so his thoughts, his innermost secrets, belong to
the state. And any tactics required to get possession of them are
justified.
The aid of science itself has been enlisted in this attack on the right
to silence. Other ages saw confessions wrung from victims by means
of rather crude methods of physical torture. It has been left to our
age of progress to witness a scientific attack on the mind itself. Brainwashing techniques, truth-drugs (a misnomer if there ever was one),
hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion, all have been used to draw
from their victims contrite and abject confessions of purely fictitious
crimes.
It should be obvious to everyone that man has a right not only to
silence but to any other legitimate means of self-defense against any
attempt to elicit a false confession. No one would ever question this
right. In fact, moralists, far from questioning the right to silence,
have actually questioned the liceity of a false confession in such circumstances. It will perhaps soften our judgment toward those who in
recent times have made false confessions to escape torture to mention
that many moralists did not consider this seriously wrong even though
it might lead to a death sentence.' Undergoing extreme torture was
considered by them an extraordinary, and therefore non-obligatory,
means of preserving life.
But we are more concerned here tonight with the right to silence
in a situation of actual crime. May a crime be legitimately concealed
from the public authorities? Before any attempt can be made to handle
this question, it must be broken down into more specific issues. A distinction must be made between the actual criminal and others who
* Society of Jesus; Professor of Moral Theology, West Baden College, West

Baden Springs, Indiana; Litt.B., Xavier University; M.A., Loyola University
of Chicago, doctorate in theology (S.T.D.) from Gregorian University in
Rome.
'LEoNARDUs LESSIUS, S.J., DE IURE FT IUSTITIA, Lib. 2, Cap. 11, Dub. 7, n. 41.

19561

THE RIGHT TO SILENCE

have knowledge of the crime. And in connection with those who have
knowledge of the crime two distinct obligations must be considered,
the obligation to report a crime or denounce a criminal and the obligation to serve as a witness in a criminal case. We will deal first with
the obligation of the criminal himself.
All moralists admit that no criminal has an obligation to make a
spontaneous revelation of his crime to the public authorities. This
would be expecting too much of human nature. But the problem goes
deeper. It concerns not so much a spontaneous revelation as the obligation to admit a crime when questioned by public authority. Is the
defendant in a criminal case obliged to answer truthfully when questioned directly by public authorities concerning his guilt? Moral theologians have always held that a subject is bound to answer truthfully a
legitimate question put to him by a superior. But the concept of the
legitimate question in connection with a defendant in a criminal case
has undergone a very interesting evolution during the past several
centuries.
It was always held by moralists that no one was bound to confess
a completely hidden or occult crime. The maxim Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, that is, no one is obliged to betray himself, was always
considered to cover at least this one case. For the rest, St. Thomas
Aquinas tells us that the law will determine when a judge may legitimately question a defendant in a criminal case. In his day and for
several centuries afterward it was the Roman Law that determined
judicial procedure. According to Roman Law a judge was allowed to
put a direct question to a defendant regarding his guilt whenever (1)
he was under infamy for the crime, that is, when he was publicly
known to have committed the crime, or (2) when there was clear
evidence, or (3) when a semi-complete proof could be brought forth
against the defendant. 2 The semi-complete proof could be provided
by the testimony of one immediate witness who was well above all
suspicion (omni exceptione maior). If any of these three conditions
were fulfilled, the judge could question the defendant concerning his
crime and according to St. Thomas Aquinas he was bound to answer
truthfully.

3

It is interesting and pertinent to our discuission tonight to note
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answer a judge questioning him whether he killed the man. Also, in
circumstances where the defendant had committed no crime but would
become suspect if he gave a direct answer to a question, moralists held
that he could maintain silence or give an evasive answer. Thus, if the
gun with which the crime was committed belonged to him and he was
questioned regarding its ownership, moralists would not oblige him to
admit ownership. We are here in the area of evidence which would
tend to incriminate even in a case where no crime had been committed
by the defendant. Moralists have never obliged a defendant to admit
such evidence.
Should one be tempted to pass a rather harsh judgment on the
theologians and jurists of the scholastic age who imposed on a criminal
the obligation to confess his crime when legitimately questioned, it
might be well to mention a few mitigating circumstances. First of all,
a confession was ordinarily necessary for conviction. Since normally
the complete proof was difficult to obtain independently of a confession, and the exception rather than the rule, the confession was
ordinarily necessary to complete the proof against the defendant.
Moreover, if one feels that the defendant was at a disadvantage in
comparison with the defendant in modern times, it might be well to
remember that the position of the plaintiff in those days restored some
of the balance. The plaintiff who could not prove his case was liable
to a conviction for calumny and a subsequent application of the lex
talionis, that is, the law of retaliation.5 One who realized that he
would be liable to the very punishment which the defendant, if convicted, would have received would be careful not to introduce a case
without adequate evidence.
This opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas prevailed for several centuries.
But early in the fifteenth century another opinion took root which
would eventually (in the late 18th century) make its way into modern
legal codes and inspire our own Fifth Amendment. Nicholas Tudeschi,
Archbishop of Palermo, known among theologians and jurists as
Abbas Panormitanus, in his Commentary on the Decretals of Gregory
IX stated that the opinion of St. Thomas and his followers was true in
connection with spiritual penalties but not in relation to temporal
penalties.6 This opinion was taken up by the so-called Summists of the
late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.7 These Summists, who wrote
practical moral manuals for confessors, carried little authority but
they were later supported by several of the more speculative moral
5 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, q. 68, a. 4.
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theologians who adopted the opinion. By the end of the sixteenth
century it was considered a solidly probable opinion that at least where
the death sentence awaited the defendant he would not be obliged to
give a direct answer to a judge who questioned him about his guilt.,
This opinion was later extended (by Lessius, it seems) to cases where
other penalties of a very serious nature were involved, e.g., condemnation to the galleys, confiscation of property, complete loss of reputation, etc.9
The main
Several arguments were used to support this opinion.
argument used by these moralists seemed to be that a law should be
humanly possible and accommodated to human weakness; otherwise,
it is a useless law and serves only to burden consciences. These authors
go on to say that it is impossible, humanly speaking, to expect a man
who knows that he would not be condemned otherwise to provide the
court with the testimony necessary for his conviction. One might
as well expect him to provide his executioners with the necessary
weapons. To add strength to this argument Cardinal De Lugo goes
on to say that experience has shown that the only thing which brings
out these confessions is the fear of torture." Without torture the
state would have little chance of eliciting such confessions. This
experience clearly shows that confessions of guilt, at least where
serious penalties are involved, go beyond the powers of weak human
nature.
Moral theologians also argued that no one should be obliged to
cooperate in his own punishment. Going back to St. Thomas, they
found that working on this principle he allowed a criminal to evade a
court summons. He also allowed a condemned criminal to escape from
jail if he could do so without the use of violence. These theologians
saw no reason why the same principle could not be applied to a direct
question regarding guilt.
A third argument was drawn from an analogy with the obligations
of a witness. The witness is ordinarily not obliged to testify against
close relatives. How much less reason is there to oblige or expect one
to testify against himself.
Fourthly, they argued that a human law can only in very rare
circumstances impose an obligation on subjects which would involve
an heroic act of self-sacrifice. Thus, for instance, in time of war, if
there were question of preventing some serious harm to the community, the state might oblige one of its citizens to go on what would
practically be a death mission. It is not clear, they argued, that this
8 IOANNEs DE LuGo, DE luRE
9

Er IUSTITIA,

Disp. 40, Sect. 1, n. 14 (Vol. 7).

LEONARDUS LEssius, DE luRE Er IusTiTni, Lib. 2, Cap. 31, Dub. 3, n. 17.
20
cit., n.
IusrTiAn, Disp. 40, Sect. 1, n. 16.
"Iloc.
DF lURE
ET 16.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

situation of very serious harm to the community would be verified
if a criminal were not to confess his crime. It is difficult to understand, then, how a human law can impose on a defendant an obligation which would involve the loss of his life.
Finally, they argued that no one is obliged to testify against another in a case where he would have reason to fear serious harm to
himself. The same argument seems to carry weight in regard to selfincrimination. It would be somewhat incongruous if in a situation
where only a defendant and a witness knew of a crime the witness
would be excused from giving testimony because it would result in
serious harm to himself whereas the defendant would not be allowed
to use such an excuse.
With these arguments such moralists as Peter of Navarre, Emmanuel Sa, Lessius, Reginaldus, Filliucius, De Lago, and many other
theologians of the late 16th and 17th centuries, including Suarez,
allowed a defendant in a criminal case where there was liability to a
very severe penalty to evade a direct question regarding guilt. 1 2 The
opinion at that time did not completely overshadow the opinion of St.
Thomas but it was accepted as a solidly probable opinion which could
safely be reduced to practice.
With the advent of modern civil codes the right to silence of a
defendant in a criminal case has been established in judicial procedure. This right is embodied in our own Fifth Amendment. It has
been established by removing from the judge the right to demand a
confession or incriminating evidence from the defendant. The defendant is no longer under oath, that is, unless he consents to take
the witness stand, and it is up to his discretion to plead guilty or not
guilty to a criminal charge. This is true even in Ecclesiastical law.
Canon 1743 of the Code of Canon Law reads as follows:
The parties are bound to respond and answer truthfully when
the judge legitimately questions them, unless the question concerns some crime committed by themselves.
Thus, while the general principle that one is bound to answer truthfully when legitimately questioned by a superior is still valid, the
trend of modern legislation has been to remove personal guilt from
the legitimate area of judicial questioning.
The purpose of this legislation is not to protect or give immunity
to the criminal. It is rather to adjust the demands of the law to the
capacity of human nature and eliminate the need of the torture system
as a necessary reinforcement of the human will. As De Lago said,
it was not the demands of the law but the fear of torture that brought
out confessions of guilt. It seems clear then that there is a very inti12 Cf. DE LuGo, op. cit., n. 14.
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mate connection between obligatory confession and the torture system.
Besides involving a violation of the human person before he was
found guilty of any crime, this system had one serious defect; it was
equally effective in eliciting false as well as true confessions. Since
the confession was more an indication of the severity of the torture
than of actual guilt, there was no guarantee against condemnation
of an innocent person. Our own legislation, in refusing to allow the
violation of the human person before guilt has been established, shows
a much greater respect for the dignity of the human person. It may
be true that it gives protection to those who in no way deserve it. But
it prefers to allow a criminal to go unpunished rather than run the
risk of submitting an innocent person to unjust punishment.
But the problem being discussed here tonight concerns not only
those who have committed crimes but also those who have knowledge
of criminal conduct on the part of others. 13 Obviously, these latter
cannot have the right to silence which the defendant enjoys. If they
did, the whole function of judicial prosecution would be impossible.
As already mentioned, two distinct obligations can be considered relating to persons having knowledge of crime, the obligation to report the
crime and the obligation to serve as witness in a criminal procedure.
Let us first consider the obligation to report crime.
Prescinding from those who are obliged by reason of their office
to report crime, e.g., local and state police, agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, etc., one can make the general statement that
the obligation to report a crime is somewhat limited. There are many
instances in which an ordinary citizen may laudably report a crime
but in which no obligation can be imposed. We are not dealing with
such cases but only with those cases in which an obligation to report
crime exists.
All moral theologians admit that no one has an obligation to report
a crime committed against his own person which in no way affects
others. The evangelical counsel to forgive trespasses committed
against us precludes the possibility of such an obligation. It does not,
of course, prevent one from making a denunciation of a criminal to
the public authorities. Moral theologians agree further that there is
no obligation, at least from a juridical standpoint, to report a crime
which affects only the delinquent and in no way harms others.
This leaves only two cases to be considered. The first concerns a
crime which is a cause of unjust damage to an innocent third party;
the second, one which does damage to the community. Charity would
13
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oblige one to protect the innocent third party unless doing so would
involve serious difficulty. In crime involving damage to the community the obligation to make a denunciation binds even at the cost of
serious personal inconvenience. The common good is to be preferred
to the good of the individual. Since this paper is concerned predominantly with damage to the community, we will not consider the
case of damage to an innocent third party.
But the obligation to report crime, even where it prevails, does not
fall equally on the shoulders of all. In determining it, the first factor
to be considered is the origin of the knowledge. Those who are in
possession of knowledge of crime by reason of professional work of
a fiduciary nature have either no obligation to report a crime or a very
limited one.
One who has received information regarding a crime through the
medium of sacramental confession, far from having any obligation to
report it, would incur the most serious ecclesiastical penalties for
revealing it to anyone and would be guilty of a serious wrongdoing
if he used it in any way which would be embarrassing to the penitent.
There is no common good which would compensate for the damage
that would be done if the relationship between confessor and penitent
were undermined.
The professional secret, though sacred, is not as absolute as the
sacramental secret. The doctor, the lawyer, the counselor must respect
the confidence of his patient or client, but where there is question
of serious harm to the community, he not only may but actually must
report a crime. For instance, if a doctor discovered that a patient
employed as a pilot in air transport or an engineer on the train were
subject to epileptic fits or the victim of a serious heart condition, he
would be obliged to report this fact to the patient's employer if he
refused to change employment. In some states, also, a doctor is
obliged to report to the police any patient treated for a bullet wound.
But those engaged in professional work of a fiduciary nature must
also consider the dangers that would result from loss of confidence in
the profession and balance these against the harm that would be done
by failing to report a case. If people were to be alienated from the
profession by a fear that their confidence would not be respected, the
common good might suffer greater damage than it would if a particular criminal were not apprehended.
Close relationship will also excuse one from the obligation of reporting a crime unless there is question of very serious harm to the
community which would not otherwise be averted. Thus, a son would
not be obliged to report a father for some crime committed. Besides
being too much to expect of a son, reporting a father would seem to
go contrary to filial piety.
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No private citizen has an obligation to report a crime merely to
see a criminal punished. The function of punishment is the duty of
the state; it does not pertain to any private citizen. Neither does a
private citizen have any obligation to report a delinquent if the fault
has already been corrected and there is no danger of a relapse. Moreover, since no criminal is bound to manifest himself, neither would he
be bound to manifest his accomplices if he could not do so without
revealing his own crime, unless perhaps there were question of very
serious damage to the common good.
What if one knows that even if he reports a crime, it cannot be
proved juridically? Would he still be bound to make the report? An
obligation might well exist even in this case. Reporting the crime
would at least serve the purpose of alerting the public officials to the
danger. It might well be that the danger to the community would be
averted even though the delinquent might not be brought to justice.
One may wonder why moral theologians are so reluctant to impose
obligations in regard to reporting crime. The reason is, I believe, that
the right to a reputation is involved. Every man has a right to a reputation among his fellowmen. Such a reputation is necessary for survival within a community. This right extends even to a false reputation, so that ordinarily even a true crime, if it is occult, may not be
revealed. The common good would also seem to demand this regard
for the reputation of others. An atmosphere of informing does not
make for peace and harmony in the community. It rather engenders
suspicion and distrust, and inhibits the spirit of charity necessary to
unite the members of the community into one organic social body. The
right to a false reputation, of course, is not absolute, but it will prevail
until one is guilty of some public crime or until some other right clearly
supercedes it. This will obviously be the case when reporting a crime
will be the only way of adverting serious harm to the community.
The final function which is pertinent to our discussion is that of
witness. The distinction between one who denounces a crime and one
who testifies is simply this; the witness is part of the judicial process
itself. The witness does not function until formal accusation or denunciation has been made, or at least until the crime has been brought
somehow to the attention of public officials.
The older moralists used to distinguish two types of criminal procedure, the inquiry and the procedure more familiar to us which followed upon formal accusation of the suspected criminal. In the former
procedure the judge and his court of inquiry would visit the community where the crime occurred or at least where crime was suspected
to exist and question the members of the community to uncover it. In
such an inquiry moralists held that no member of the community
would be obliged to testify unless the identity of the criminal were a
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public fact. Again, the reputation of the culprit was at stake. If the
crime were occult or at least his identity unknown, no one would be
obliged to reveal the culprit in the inquiry.
But in the ordinary judicial procedure where formal accusation
had already been made, the witness was bound under oath to testify
truthfully to the knowledge he had of the crime. If he failed to do so,
he would be guilty of serious wrongdoing. Although excusing causes
were, and still are, admitted, the obligation to testify is much more
absolute than the obligation to denounce. In general the good of the
defendant gives way to the right of the state to proof. For instance,
the obligation to testify truthfully would prevail even in a case where
the crime was clearly a thing of the past and there was no danger of
recurrence.
Moralists have, however, allowed some excusing causes even in
regard to the function of witness. Secret knowledge, for instance, is
considered for the most part privileged, just as it is in estimating the
obligation to report a crime. Near relatives are also excused from
testifying. Finally, if the witness has reason to fear that serious harm
will come to himself from testifying he will be excused except in a
case where his own good would have to be sacrificed to the good of
the community.
There remains the task of applying these principles to the problem
at hand, namely, the obligation to testify before a congressional committee. And the application is not easy to make. The reason for the
difficulty is that the role of the witness before the committee with his
rights and obligations has never been cleary defined. At one time he
may find himself in the role of a defendant, at another in the role of
one reporting crime, at still another in the role of witness. In a sense,
also, he is not, strictly speaking, any one of these. Since congressional
investigations are functions of the legislative rather than the judicial
branch of our government and aimed at legislation rather than prosecution, those called to testify should not, at least in theory, be identified
with functionaries in a judicial process. But in practice congressional
investigations have taken on at least the superfical form of a judicial
inquiry. It is also true that testimony presented to the committees is
ordinarily available to the justice department for prosecution. Moreover, since such investigations are frequently public, even broadcast
and telecast, the reputations of those called to testify, as well as any
against whom they might testify, are at stake. Some legal clarification
of the rights and duties of the witness before a congressional committee is certainly to be desired. But for the present the principles
that apply to judicial procedure apply also to congressional investigations. Working on this assumption, I would arrive at the following
conclusions:
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1. It is not clear that one would have a moral obligation to testify
to any personal crime or give answers which would tend to incriminate him in a congressional investigation. Though it is true that such
investigations are not aimed at prosecution, as long as the witness is
not made immune to such prosecution, his testimony can be used
against him. It may be that the number of those who have been prosecuted in the past has been relatively small, but this is merely a de facto
situation which hardly makes for security on the witness stand. Unless
it is supported by juridical protection, it will be difficult to insure a
witness that his testimony will not be used against him. Given this lack
of legal security and the opportunity of appealing to the Fifth Amendment, it is difficult to see how an obligation can be imposed on a witness to give self-incriminating testimony.
2. One called before a congressional committee has a moral obligation to denounce a criminal when such testimony is necessary to
avert serious harm to the community which could not otherwise be
avoided. The obligation to make such a denunciation to a congressional committee will be clear when the harm can be averted only
through legislation. If it can be averted through prosecution, a denunciation to the justice department would seem preferable.
3. There is no moral obligation to denounce one who has committed some crime in the past but who has mended his ways.
4. If the identity of the criminal is a public fact, one serving aswitness would be morally obliged to answer truthfully any question.
put to him concerning the crime in a congressional inquiry. If the
identity of the criminal is not a public fact but the committee can show
that the equivalent of a formal accusation is in its possession, a witness.
would be obliged to testify concerning the crime unless he could claim
some excusing cause.1 4
5. It is absolutely immoral to refuse to cooperate with a congressional committee with the intention of protecting evil or crime. While
the moral law will allow the protection of those who are guilty of
criminal acts, it can never sanction the protection of evil or crime itself. Any efforts, therefore, to block the rooting out of evil or the
prevention of crime are clearly contrary to good morality.
In these conclusions it should be noted that we are speaking only of
obligation. There is no attempt to determine what would be the better
or the more patriotic course of action. Certainly, the desire of every
citizen should be to cooperate as much as possible with those who are
carrying on investigations for the welfare of our country. Actually,
14
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there is no obligation to testify. There might be an obligation to denounce the
criminal if the conditions mentioned in n. 2 are fulfilled.
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those who have been perfectly candid in dealing with such committees
have fared better than those who have appealed to the Fifth Amendment. Such appeal, while it may give one a feeling of security against
prosecution, rightly or wrongly, creates suspicion of guilt in the
popular mind. The consequent impression is that the intent of those
who appeal to this amendment is not so much to protect themselves
as it is to protect evil and crime itself.
There has been no intention in this paper to discredit congressional
committees in any way. It is certainly the function of congressmen to
make whatever investigations may be necessary to the proper performance of their duty as legislators. They are entitled to question
anyone from whom they have reason to expect helpful information.
Our purpose has been merely to show that there are also other rights
which may be legitimately pursued. The right to proof will at times
yield to the right to silence. It may well be that the undeserving will
hide behind this right of silence. It may even be that those who are
invoking it today are doing so in behalf of a system which would
destroy it. It would indeed be a catastrophe if such people should
eventually succeed in destroying the right which is now protecting
them. But it would be a greater catastrophe if we should destroy it
ourselves.

THE FIFTH AMENDEMENT TODAY
ERwIN N. GviswoLD*
I am very glad to have the opportunity to participate in this discussion of one of the important questions of our time. There has been
much public interest in problems of the Fifth Amendment over the
past several years, and it seems to me highly desirable that the public
should have as fine and complete understanding of the problems involved there as it can. It is therefore a fine thing, I think, that Dean
Seitz and the Marquette Law School have planned a program of this
sort. I am very happy indeed, and honored, to have the opportunity to
appear with gentlemen of the caliber of Father Connery and Mr.
Williams in discussing these questions.
My own feeling is that the greatest harm that has been done in
this whole area over the past few years is that of setting man against
man and ingendering suspicions among good honest, conscientious
Americans. I'll let you into a secret. I regard myself as a good American. I am deeply attached to this country, my own, my native land.
Indeed, I am especially pleased to come to Milwaukee and to this
University named after that great pioneer, Father Marquette, in part
because I too was born on the shores of one of the Great Lakes, Lake
Erie. I grew up in Cleveland, and I think of myself as a middlewesterner now somewhat miscast in the East, and I rather feel at
home when I come out to these middle western states.
Now I would like to say one more thing which probably is quite
unnecessary and unwarranted, but I think it is worth stating-I don't
like Communists-I don't like Communism. I think that Communism
is the greatest single threat to America and to American civil liberties.
I know full well that civil liberties would be more completely done
away "withthan any other way if the Communists, internal or external,
took over control of this country. I will go even further. I don't like
people who ever have been Communists. I don't say that I wouldn't
walk out of the same room with them or that I wouldn't listen to them
discuss a problem. I am happier about people who were Communists
and aren't now, very much happier than I am about people who are
Communists now. But frankly, just between you and me, I have
personally a serious reservation about the judgment of anyone who at
any time has ever been a Communist.
At the present time we are inclined to think of Communism as our
implacable and endless enemy. We are inclined to think that this
struggle will go on for all time until one or the other prevails. But I
and Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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don't take quite such a dim view. I think that it could go on for a
long time, and in the process I think that the Russians in one way are
our best friends, because if they really were skillful in this area they
would have played good and would have done nothing to upset us
over the past ten years, and then I think that it is very likely that they
could, without very serious difficulty, have walked in and taken us
over. But as a matter of fact, they have rattled the saber very vigorously outside and they have carried on rather obvious and not very
skillful activities within the country so that we have been rather constantly alerted, and it seems to me that we are in good shape to take
care of ourselves. We have excellent agencies designed for that end,
and I have great confidence in them. Some people talk about the
eternal struggle between our system and the Communists. I am inclined to recall the fact that some centuries ago people felt the same
way as to the relations between the Christian world and the Mohammedan world, and that that struggle would never end until one or the
other triumphed. Yet it did end, somehow or other; and in many
ways, the Christian world now gets along very satisfactorily with the
Moslem world. We have a considerable number of Arab students
from one country or another at the Harvard Law School, mostly as
graduate students, and I find them very intelligent, reasonable and
interesting persons who do not seem, in any way, intent upon destroying us. And the time may well come when we may work out some
sort of relationship with the Communist world. But clearly that is not
the situation now.
Now turning more specifically to the Fifth Amendment, I am very
happy, indeed, to have had this very enlightening discussion by
Father Connery in terms of morals. I cannot attempt, of course, to
speak as any moral authority, but as I followed his discussion it seemed
to me that in most respects the law, as I understand it, was closely in
accord with the morals as he outlined them. In the first place we are
often told that a claim of the privilege under the Fifth Amendment is
wrong, unjustifiable, illegal because there is a right in the public to
have every man's evidence. I myself think that that right so stated
is over stated. It seems to me quite clear that it is our law and is our
practice that there is no right on the part of the public to have every
man's evidence. One of the clearest instances, suggested by Father
Connery, is the fact that it is the law and always has been, and as far
as I know, no one questions it, that a wife is not required to testify
against her husband or a husband is not required to testify against his
wife. And similarly, the privilege between the attorney and client is
well established and would, I am sure, be honored by virtually every
lawyer even against an order of the court where the lawyer felt that
that order was clearly unjustified. And similarly in legal terms the
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privilege between priest and penitent is not merely well established,
but is unquestioned in any court. So that it is not true that the public
has the right to every man's evidence. It is true that under many
circumstances the public has the right to every man's evidence, but
the question is to determine in the particular case whether this is one
of the situations where the public does have that right.
There is a tendency of rights to make themselves absolute, tendency
to which Justice Holmes has several times made allusion. But actually
most of the problems of life, most of the problems of law, with respect
to life, at least, consist in adjusting the competing claim of two or
more objectives each one of which would make itself absolute if it
could. But no one of these claims can be absolute, and we have to
adjust them and find out what is the proper balance. Indeed one of
the things that makes life and law interesting is these problems of
working out the proper balance between competing claims.
So this problem of the Fifth Amendment, it seems to me, is a part
of a much broader question in our country today-the whole problem
of the relation between security on the one hand and civil liberties on
the other. Now security and civil liberties are both highly desirable
things. Each one standing by itself could readily become an absolute.
If we sought no end in life except security, we could no doubt achieve
security and what we had made secure would not be worth having.
And on the other hand if we sought no other object in life except
civil liberty, we might have very great civil liberties and we might end
up also with having lost our civil liberties to having given up all
vestige of security. And so our problem is to work out that adjustment, and that, it seems to me, is the essential question in the Fifth
Amendment and in the whole area of Congressional investigation of
the present time.
My feeling is that in some quarters in some way we have lost some
of that balance and that the Fifth Amendment has, in fact, proved
to be a very valuable and a very sound weapon in maintaining some
of the balance in favor of civil liberty on the one hand in the problem
of adjusting security and civil liberties. I want to read now a passage
from a Congressional investigation that was held in another state,
and the senator involved comes from another state. I am not going
to mention his name because I do not desire to make any attack of
any sort on any individual. I am trying to discuss problems which are
of great concern to you and to all of us. The individual involved here
fortunately had a good anonymous name. He is Mr. Smith. So I am
going to read his name, Mr. Smith, who was an attorney.
"I think it would be proper at this time if I could be informed
by you, Sir, if there are to be any opportunities afforded me to
question this witness concerning this."
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Senator X:
"I judge you are a very reputable and a very fine lawyer, and
if you are, you certainly know that in Congressional committee
hearings there is no such thing as cross-examination by an
attorney for a party. This is in the nature of a grand jury
proceeding. You do not have that right, and I judge you know
that never in the history of this country has such a thing been
permitted and it will not be permitted here."
Mr. Smith: "The reason I ask ... " Senator X: "I am not interested
in the reason. There will be no right in cross-examination." Mr.
Smith: "Are there any other rules of procedure that this committee is
prepared to tell us ?" Senator X: "I will announce them when I desire. Proceed." Now that is a quotation from the transcript of a
Congressional hearing.
At approximately the same time there was being conducted in
Australia, a very important investigation, into the Petrov Affair. The
The Petrov affair is highly illuminating to Americans, and I wish it
were better known by more Americans, not merely the facts of the
investigation but also the material disclosed by the report. It is very
similar to the investigation of a Royal Commission in Canada in 1945,
about which too little is known in this country. You may remember
that Petrov was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Australia, and
that some year and a half ago he defected to the Australians; and
some ten days later his wife, who was being taken out of the country
by a Russian agent, also at the last moment chose to make her life
in Australia. The Australian Government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate this affair. The Royal Commission consisted of
three judges, one each from the Supreme Courts of three of the states
in Australia. And those judges conducted a very painstaking and
thorough investigation over a period of a year and about three months
ago put out a very complete report. It happened that one of the judges
is a friend of mine, and he caused to be sent to me by air mail the
daily printed transcripts of these hearings, two copies--one of which,
after looking at it, I put in the Harvard Law School Library, and the
other of which I gave to the Russian Research Center at Harvard.
When the report was finished, he sent me a copy of it, and he wrote
me a letter in which this passage appeared:
"You will probably also be interested in our procedures in a
Royal Commission, which I gather differ in some respects from
those followed by a Congressional Committee. A person against
whom anything was alleged was given notice of the allegation
before his name was publicly mentioned. He was summoned to
appear as a witness at crown expense. Evidence concerning him
was given in his presence, and he was entitled to be represented
by counsel, of course, at his own expense. Most witnesses were
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represented by counsel. Counsel had full opportunity of crossexamining any witness giving evidence affecting his client and
of examining his client when he was called to the witness stand.
Counsel had no right as he has in a court trial, of calling such
witnesses as he thought fit, but he could apply to the Commissioners to summon a witness. No such application was refused
except where we thought the evidence proposed to be used
would be irrelevent or unnecessary. I am afraid that many
Americans would think our methods in such an inquiry involving Communists rather kid gloved but they are in accordance with our tradition which rightly or wrongly we feel to be
sound."
I would like to say to you that I think that such procedures are,
indeed, in accord with our tradition in this country, and it is most
unfortunate that over the past few years some few people in public
office have failed to comply with that very sound and very salutary
tradition.
Now what has this to do with the Fifth Amendment. I think it has
a great deal to do with the Fifth Amendment, because I think that the
way which some Congressional investigations have been conducted
has much to do with the explanation as to why people have claimed
the privilege of the Fifth Amendment in Congressional investigations.
In the first place, let us put completely to one side the claim of
privilege under the Fifth Amendment with respect to trials in court.
As far as I know there is simply no controversy about that. The controversy arises with respect to the claim of privilege in connection
with investigation conducted by legislative agencies. Now let me also
say one thing more. I think that in many cases the privilege has been
wrongly claimed by people who were not legally entitled to do so, and
I also think that in many cases where the privilege was claimed by
persons who were legally entitled to do so they were mistaken in claiming the privilege and they would have been better off and everyone
else would have been better off and much less harm would have been
done to the cause in which they were interested, if they had not
claimed the privilege. Nevertheless, what we are dealing with in many
of these cases is the fact that people do claim the privilege, rightly or
wrongly; and it seems to me highly desirable that we should understand the reasons which lie behind the claim of privilege in many of
these cases and should not jump to conclusions with respect to the
proper inferences, the proper conclusions, to be drawn from that claim.
Now it is often said that a person who claims the privilege against
self-incrimination is obviously either a criminal or a liar. Either he
committed the crime, in which case if he claims the privilege, he is a
criminal and he is simply avoiding having to confess it and out of
the kindness of our heart we don't make him confess it; or else he
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didn't commit the crime, and then when he claims the privilege and
says that he will be incriminated if he answers, he is a liar; and therefore, it's obvious that he is either a criminal or a liar. Now Father
Connery pointed out very plainly in his address that that is not the
case. He referred to the man who was the owner of the gun with
which the crime was committed but who did not himself commit the
crime. Nevertheless, if he admits ownership of that weapon, he may
be in a very difficult situation. There is a case where a person may
legally, clearly, claim the privilege, rightly, although he did not commit the crime.
There are other types of situations with which lawyers, who
practice in the criminal courts, are thoroughly aware. Just think for
a moment of the plight of some poor devil who hasn't done very well
in life but is trying now. He has twice before been convicted of crime,
has served time in jail for each one of them, and is now out and trying
very hard to lead an honest life and thinks that he is successful. But
he is picked up by the police and charged with an offense, which he
didn't commit, and which he knows he didn't commit. I don't want
to blame the policemen much because the offense was committed and
here is this fellow that everyone knows has a record and someone
saw him hanging around the corner not long before the crime was
committed, so the natural thing to do was for the police to bring him
in and charge him. Well now he is tried, and you're his lawyer, and
the obvious thing to do is to put him on the witness stand and let him
deny that he committed the crime. And the moment you do that, he
is subject to cross-examination and as soon as the cross-examination
is started, out come these two prior convictions of other offenses. And
then how long does the jury believe that he didn't commit this crime.
Everyone knows that any criminal lawyer in that situation simply has
to decide whether he likes it or not, and knowing full well that it
probably will be fatal, he simply has to decide that his client cannot
take the stand. And yet there is a case where the man did not commit
the crime, where his failure to take the stand is not an admission of
guilt. It is simply one where the circumstances are that if he is subjected to cross-examination he is surely sunk and he is just almost
surely sunk if he doesn't take the stand; but being almost surely sunk
is a little better than being surely sunk, so the lawyer tells him not to
do it. Now that really is one of our tough situations. So is it not
perfectly clear that a man may claim the privilege although he neither
committed an offense nor is he lying when he says that he will be
incriminated if he gives an answer?
Quite apart from that there are a good many other reasons, it
seems to me, why people sometimes claim the privilege even though
they would be better advised and would be making wiser decisions if
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they did not claim the privilege. One of the reasons is that a good
many people, particularly people who get involved in this area, are
just plain stubborn. They are the kind of people that martyrs are
made out of and sometimes they just go down the line and make
themselves martyrs, and I am sorry when they do. I had a letter just
this Fall from a man who asked me for some help which I was unable
to give him and, of course, I won't mention his name, but this is one
of the paragraphs in his letter.
"For your information, although I would never upon demand
tell any man, I am not nor have I ever been a member of the
Communist party or a member of any organization upon the
so-called Attorney General's list. I am not a Marxist and, in
fact, I disagree with most of what I know of it, and I think that
my political philosophy closely parallels that of Thomas Jefferson."
But note that "although I would never upon demand tell to any
man." Now there are a lot of people who act and think that way.
They don't like to be pushed around. I don't like to be pushed around,
but sometimes when I am being pushed around I may find it, on the
whole, the part of wisdom, to play along, because maybe I can get
through it without doing too great harm and it will be easier than just
getting my back up. But there are some people who are made of
sterner stuff and they just say, "Look, I am not going to tell you when
it is demanded of me. I will stand on my record. You have no right
to ask me some of these questions." Now as a matter of fact maybe
the inquirer does have a right to ask him some questions. But in this
particular case, the man who doesn't answer is not guilty of the crime
of being a Communist, if that is a crime. Generally it isn't. He is not
guilty of the crime of concealing vital information from the government. He is just guilty of the crime of being stubborn. And there
are many circumstances in which stubborness is a quality which is
rather highly regarded in this country.
There is another explanation of the claim of privilege. In a good
many cases, it is a mildly technical one, one which seems to me not
inappropriate to mention at a meeting sponsored by a Law School.
This is the matter of waiver of the privilege. It is, of course, clear
that where in an ordinary court case, a witness goes in and testifies
affirmatively, he then becomes subject to cross-examination. And he
cannot on cross-examination claim the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to matters about which he testified in his beginning
evidence, because if he is going to try to use his evidence against the
other side, the other side has a right to explore that evidence, and see
whether it is sound. Thus it is well established that a witness who
participates in the testimony in chief waives the privilege against self-
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incrimination with respect to appropriate cross-examination about his
testimony. I think that that is a rule that is fine, sound and more or
less inevitable.
It is my own view, for what it is worth, that the Supreme Court
made a mistake some four or five years ago in a case called the Rogers
case, when they extended that rule to witnesses who are appearing
before a Congressional Committee and who are simply responding
to questions and who are not seeking to prove anything affirmatively
for themselves or for any person on whose behalf they are appearing.
Now in the Rogers case, the witness was first asked by an inquirer,
before an investigating committee, whether she was or had been a
Communist, and she said, "yes". And she was asked whether she
had been secretary of the Communist party in Denver and she said,
"yes';. And then she was asked, "What did you do with the records of
the Communist party in Denver?" She said, "I refuse to answer
on the grounds of self-incrimination." The Supreme Court later held
by a sharply divided court that by having answered those first two
questions she had waived the privilege with respect to the whole field,
the whole area, of her being a Communist and being secretary of a
Communist Party and that she could not properly claim the privilege
after having entered into the field. It seems to me a little odd that a
person should be worse off because he cooperates part way and then
stops than he is when he refuses to answer any questions at all. And
yet that is the effect of the Rogers case, and I suspect that in a good
many instances where persons have refused to answer questions that
sounded very damning, it was because their counsel had told them,
"Look, you can't answer a single question. If you want to rely on
the privilege at all, you must claim the privilege at the very beginning
and not answer a single question."
Let me illustrate this by a case with which I had to deal myself
as Dean of the Harvard Law School, a case which is a matter of public
record so that I can properly talk about it. We had two students at
Harvard Law School, twin brothers, who were brought before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee presided over by Senator
jenner two years ago last March. These students had been undergraduates at Cornell University and I rather believe, although I do not
know, that when they were 17 and 18 years old, or perhaps 18 and
19 years old, they were members of an organization which I wish they
had not been members of, to put it mildly. Thereafter they came to
the Harvard Law School. They were asked by Senator Jenner, "Did
you hold Communist meetings in your rooms at the Harvard Law
School ?" "I refuse to answer on the grounds of the Fifth Amendment." "Did you collect Communist party dues from other students at
the Harvard Law School?" "I refuse to answer on the grounds of
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the Fifth Amendment." From which, of course, a large body of
opinion jumped to the conclusion, or perhaps I shouldn't say jumped,
I don't want to overload it, came to the conclusion that they had held
Communist meetings in Harvard Law School, and that they had
collected Communist party dues from students in the Harvard Law
School.
It isn't given to man to know for certain what other people did at
some time past, but it is given to the Dean and his associates at the
Harvard Law School to know a good deal about what goes on at the
school through inquires of one sort or another, and it is my honest,
best judgment in which I have great confidence. I do not regard it as
a 51-49 matter but regard it as a 95-5 matter, that these students
never held Communist meetings in their rooms in the Harvard Law
School and never collected any Communist party dues in the Harvard
Law School. Their trouble was that they were second year students
in the Harvard Law School, and they knew some law and a little law
is a dangerous thing. They knew this rule about waiver, and they
felt that if they answered these questions, they would get back to the
questions of what they did when they were in Cornell, and then they
would have been held to have waived the privilege with respect to
those questions and could not rely upon the privilege. So they claimed
the privilege at the first opportunity. This I think is simply a consequence of the unfortunate and to me the unwarranted rule announced
by the Supreme Court some years ago with respect to waiver. It was
not a sound basis for coming to the conclusion that they had held Communist meetings in the Harvard Law School and had collected dues
from students in Harvard Law School. I can only say that I think,
though this issue didn't arise, that if we had concluded that they were
currently Communists or had held Communist meetings in their rooms
or had collected dues from fellow students in the Harvard Law School
that we would have terminated their connection with the school. We
came, on investigation, to the conclusion that they had not done those
things at the school. We came to the conclusion that whatever they
had done at Cornell some years before when they were 18 or 19
years old was not a thing as to which we should take action and we
retained them in the school and in due course they graduated magna
cum laude.
The Supreme Court has said some other things about the Fifth
Amendment, which seem to me to be pretty good, and I would like to
read just a few passages from two decisions of the Supreme Court
announced last May, Quinn v. United States and Emsbak v. United
States, both written by a simple, unassuming, great man, in my opinion, Chief Justice Warren. Now these passages are disconnected and
anyone who wants to say so can say that they are taken out of context,
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in which case I will be glad to leave the the entire copies of the
opinions here and you can read them in context.
"The privilege, this Court has stated, was generally regarded
then as now as a privilege of great value, a protection to the
innocent, though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against
heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecution. To apply the
privilege narrowly or begrudgingly, to treat it as a historical
relic, at most merely to be tolerated, is to ignore its development
and its purpose. It is precisely at such time when the privilege
is under attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely
a shield to the guilty that governmental bodies must be most
scrupulous in protecting its exercise. If it is true that in these
times a stigma may somehow result from a witness's reliance
on a self-incrimination clause, a Committee should be all the
more ready to recognize as valid claims of privilege. If an
answer to a question may tend to be incriminatory, a witness
is not deprived of the protection of the privilege merely because
the witness if subsequently prosecuted could perhaps refute
any reference of guilt arising from the answer."
There is one last thing. I have referred to stubborness and waiver.
There is one last thing that I think should be taken into account with
respect to the claim of the privilege. Do not misunderstand me, I am
not saying by any means that everyone that has claimed the privilege
is an angel or innocent or anybody I would like to spend the week
end with or anything else. I think a lot of them are very bad people,
but I also think that a lot of people have claimed the privilege under
circumstances which require our understanding and not our immediate
condemnation. Another one of the factors, which seem to me to be
highly relevant in this area, is a case of a witness being just plain
frightened. Put yourself in a position of a witness who is summoned
to one of these hearings. You probably have been a "liberal." That is
now a word of disappropriation which seems to me to be a rather
shocking commentary on our time. You probably have known people
in the past which you are now pretty doubtful about. You are hailed
down to Washington; you don't know what is up; you don't know
what they may have in their files; they don't tell you whether there
is any charge against you or whether you were simply thought of in
respect to something else and then you go into the room and it is hot
as blazes with Klieg lights, it has microphones all over the place, it
has newsreel cameras, television cameras, it has dozens of reporters;
and then, and perhaps most serious of all, it has some people presiding, who, in many instances, it seems to me, do not provide the
basis for confidence that you are going to be subject to scrupulous
fair play. There are people who have steel in their makeup. There are
people who are born exhibitionists. There are people who could go
down in that and keep their complete self control and dominate the
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situation and carry away the day, but most people aren't that sort.
Most people would be scared to death in that situation, and what do
you do when you are scared to death? You clam up; and what is the
easiest way to clam up in this area? Well, somehow or other, claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment,
rightly or wrongly, is one wall they haven't beaten down; and you
simply know that, and if you're scared to death maybe you will retreat
to any corner. But if you just say, "I won't answer on the ground of
self-incrimination," there isn't anything they can do to you. I suspect
that that has a good deal to do with the claim of privilege in some
cases.
I have made some speeches before in this area which were printed
in a little book called the Fifth Amendment. They are just speeches
and they are just efforts to contribute to thought and discussion. Mr.
Williams wrote a very thoughtful article in the Fordham Law Review,
which came out last Spring, and I am very glad that he did. As a
result Mr. Williams and I are not only appearing on the platform
tonight but we appeared once before. We are always billed as being
in violent opposition-it's going to be a great debate between Williams
and Griswold. But the problem is to find any place where there is
really any difference between us. And now I'm going to come to one of
those places, I think, unless Mr. Williams has strengthened himself
since the last attack. I can only say that the last time we appeared
together he spoke first and I spoke after him, so that it is entirely
appropriate that I should speak first and he speak after me tonight.
And he may have something up his sleeve but if he does, I can only
say that I shall listen to it with interest as I am seeking light in this
area too.
One of the places where we differ, it seems to me, is with respect
to the question of the inference to be drawn from a claim of privilege.
Mr. Williams, in his article, says that an adverse inference is always
drawn from silence. Well, I think that depends on what you mean by
inference. I think it may well be that an adverse inference is always
drawn from silence. But what is an inference? An inference isn't
really very much. If you immediately transliterate that word inference
into conclusion then I strongly disagree with Mr. Williams, and I think
that there is some risk that maybe that has been what he has been
doing in his thinking and that is what he will try to get you to think
is sound in his talk, and more power to him if he can do so. But I
still reserve my right to think it is wrong. I do not by any means take
the position that a claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment is an
absolutely colorless act simply to be disregarded and nothing could
happen when a person claims the privilege. By the same token and to
the same extent, I do not take the view, for reasons which I have
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tried to suggest, that the mere fact that a person claims the privilege
justifies you or the public or anyone else, in coming to the conclusion
that the person is a saboteur or a spy or a traitor or anything else
except maybe stubborn or confused or overinformed with respect to
the law as I think my two students were.
In a criminal case there is always evidence against the man, against
the defendant. If there isn't any evidence against him, the judge
directs a verdict of not guilty and the fact that he didn't take the stand
or claim the privilege would not be evidence against him. In Congressional investigations, we ordinarily have no evidence against the
man at all. Sometimes the Committee Chairman announces that "we
have information in our files that so and so .

. . ."

But frankly that

doesn't appeal to me as evidence. And in the absence of evidence, I
find it difficult to take the inference very hard.
There are cases where I would take the inference quite hard. One
is the case of a bank teller. Ten thousand dollars is missing from his
drawer. He is called to the bank president's office and he says, "I
refuse to answer any questions on the ground of self-incrimination."
I don't think that the bank will keep him in its employ very long, and
I am quite sure I wouldn't if I were the bank president on those facts
alone. I might want to make further inquiry, but in that case I
wouldn't need much more inquiry. Another illustration, which seems
to me a fairly clear one, is a young man teaching in a girl's school and
some untoward event has happened and he is asked by the head of the
school about it and he says, "I refuse to answer on the grounds of
self-incrimination." I think he is out. Where there is evidence that
something has been done, there is something closely connecting the
person with it, and a person has to act with responsibility, I don't
say that the claim of privilege should be completely ignored. In the
same way, a question may arise before a grievance committee of a bar
association. A lawyer is hailed before it on a complaint of a client
that the lawyer has embezzled the poor widow's funds, and the lawyer
says to the Grievance Committee, "I refuse to answer any questions on
the ground of self-incrimination." My guess is that the Grievance
Committee reports that he ought to be disbarred, and if I were on the
Grievance Committee, I think I would, assuming that there is evidence
as I have said connecting him with it, and he does not make any
appropriate response.
Now let us apply this particular thing to the case of lawyers. There
was a very interesting case down in Florida, just a few months agothe Scheiner case. Scheiner was a lawyer and a member of the Bar in
Florida. He was hailed before a Congressional Committee sitting in
New Orleans. He refused to answer questions about Communist party
membership on the ground of self-incrimination. No evidence was
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produced at that hearing or elsewhere that he was a member of the
Communist party. I don't say that there couldn't be such evidence. I
don't say that he never was a member of the Communist party. I just
say that there was no evidence of it. Thereupon the trial judge in his
County in Florida issued a rule to him to show cause why he should
not be disbarred on the sole evidence on his claim of privilege. The
trial judge entered an order of disbarment. That was appealed in the
Supreme Court of Florida where it was reversed last July by about
a 6 to 2 or 5 to 2 decision, the Supreme Court of Florida saying that
a man could not be disbarred without evidence and that his claim of
privilige standing alone was not evidence of the facts involved. Now
the committee that has that in charge is taking depositions in California
and elsewhere getting evidence upon these facts and when that evidence is produced before the court it seems to me quite clearly that
there may well be something for the court to act upon. But the mere
claim of privilege alone, it seems to me, cannot properly be the basis
for that sort of action.
There is another case to which I would like to refer decided by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire last March called the Welanko
case. Welanko was a member of the Bar of the State of New Hampshire. The attorney general of New Hampshire filed a complaint
against him seeking his disbarment on the ground that he was a member of the Community party. Welanko had moved from the state; he
was given notice; he failed to appear or make any response whatever.
And the court, I think, rightly held that he should be, not disbarred,
but suspended; and they entered an order suspending him as a member
of the Bar of the State of New Hampshire. He owed the obligation
as a member of the Bar to respond to the hearing, and if evidence
had been presented at the hearing to show he had done something
which warranted disbarment that would be a ground for disbarment.
When he failed to respond at all to the order of the court, it seems to
me quite clearly, he was properly suspended.
I only have a few more things that I would like to say by way
of conclusion. I referred to this little book of speeches of mine which
is a very modest effort. There have been a number of reviews of it
and the Stanford Law Review in one of its issues late last Spring had
two reviews, both by graduates of the Harvard Law School, both men
eminent and fine lawyers in California. One of the reviewers liked
the book and the other one didn't like the book, and I thought having
two reviews was a very fine way to deal with the problem. The man
who didn't like the book, it seems to me, has fallen into-perhaps I
shouldn't call it a trap---has fallen into the error of the "either he is
guilty or he is a liar" proposition which is also the error into which
it seems to me that a number of articles in the American Bar Journal
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have fallen. I think it simply isn't true that a man is either guilty or
he is a liar, and even if it was true perhaps being a liar in this case,
though bad, would not be as bad as being guilty which is the inference
which is often taken. One of these reviewers whose name I won't
mention, sent on to me a letter which he received from a friend of his,
also an eminent lawyer in California. In this review, the reviewer had
referred to the fact that he, the reviewer, was a Republican and a
conservative and he had said that he thought that was irrelevant. And
the person who wrote to him said:
"While I share your own doubts as to the relevance of your
being a Republican and a conservative, I am constantly surprised that so many members of our party seem to fail to understand that watering down the Fifth Amendment can well be the
prelude to watering down the free enterprise system and the
legal foundations for our way of life."
In 1780, John Adams was largely responsible for writing the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a document, which
though amended several times, is still in force. And there is one passage in that Constitution which is little known. It is fairly long, and I
won't read it all, but it is the passage which it is said John Adams
was most proud of. The passage is headed "The Encouragement of
literature, etc., duties of legislates and magistrates in all future periods,"
and this passage in the Massachusetts Constitution concludes with
these words,
"The authorities of the Commonwealth are urged to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealing, sincerity, good humor, and
all social affections and generous sentiments among the people."
And I like to think that one of the things that we need in these United
States in 1955 is a greater measure of good humor in public discussion and generous sentiments among all our people.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT IN
NON-CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS*

Our topic tonight is "The Fifth Amendment in Non-criminal Proceedings." It reflects the current interest in the privilege against selfincrimination that mention of the Fifth Amendment is assumed to refer
to that clause of the Amendment which reads:
"No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."
There are of course numerous other provisions in the Fifth
Amendment, several of them of great importance, but so great is the
controversy over the privilege against self-incrimination that the existence of these other provisions is hardly realized by the general public.
In accordance with present popular practice I shall tonight use
the expressions "Fifth Amendment" and "privilege against self-incrimination" or simply "privilege" interchangeably.
It is also curious that a privilege which developed as a feature of
criminal prosecutions should be discussed today primarily in different
connections, particularly in connection with congressional investigations and employment. Perhaps it is for this reason that we are having
so much difficulty. We are trying to apply a privilege primarily intended for one context in other contexts.
Preliminarily it will be helpful to consider the historical rationale
of the privilege. That rationale is most definitely not that ordinarily
there is anything wrong in seeking information about a person from
the man himself. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Twining v.
New Jersey, no privilege comparable to the privilege against selfincrimination is "observed ... in the search for truth outside the administration of the law."' In other words, when we want to find out
something about a person we go to that person and ask him the
questions we have on our minds. The propriety of that course is fully
recognized by our legal codes of procedure in civil cases. At common
law a party litigant was not competent to testify on his own behalf
nor could he be called by his adversary. Beginning about 1840 the
various states changed the rule and made parties to civil cases competent witnesses.2 In recent years there has been greatly increased
liberality about what is called "discovery." Under the Federal Rules
*LL.B. Yale University 1924; Law Clerk, Chief Justice Taft, 1924-25; General
Counsel, United States Department of Commerce, 1951-53; member of firm
of Maclay, Morgan & Williams, New York, New York.
1211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
28 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed.1940) §§2217-2222.
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of Civil Procedure, a party litigant can freely compel his adversary to
produce documents and submit to oral questioning not only at the trial
but also before trial.3 Pre-trial discovery is not quite so liberal in most
states, but it exists in some form or other in practically all states, if
not all of them.
If, then, the individual is recognized as the best source of information about himself, how do we happen to have the Fifth Amendment? The answer is clear, and I believe that Dean Griswold and I
agree. The privilege originated in the revulsion of the English public
against the use of torture in criminal investigation in the 17th century,
particularly against torture by the Court of Star Chamber in its investigations of political agitators and religious heretics in the reign of
Charles I, a revulsion brought to a head in the case of John Lilburne.
The privilege became accepted in English law enforcements and jurisprudence about the year 1700. Until that time it was routine in criminal investigation that suspects were examined at length by a magistrate.
Torture was applied if the magistrate thought the suspect was lying
4
or otherwise recalcitrant.
In the many debates that have occurred in the last century and a
half over the value of the privilege, this matter of torture has remained a dominant theme. Beginning with Bentham, the English legal
philosopher of the early 19th century, and continuing through the
American trust-busting era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries
and through the municipal reform period of the first part of the 20th
century the privilege has been repeatedly attacked by legal scholars
of the highest standing.5
The advocates of the privilege have continually defended it on the
ground that police examination of suspects is bound to degenerate into
torture or the equivalent of torture, such as the "third degree," unless
the privilege exists. The police, we are told, and I believe correctly,
should be made to build up their case from witnesses, not suspects. A
remark by a British police official in India has caught the attention
of students of this subject. The official said:
"It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red
pepper into a poor8' devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."

It has been suggested in the highest quarters that protection against
torture could be combined with compulsory examination of suspects.
Thus the Supreme Court of the United States said in 1937:
3 Rules 26-37.

cit. §2250, pp. 291-301.
5A number of instances are given in the writer's article, Problems of the Fifth
Airnendment, 24 FORDHAm L. REv. 19, 22-24; cf. also 8 WIGMiORE, op. cit. §2251.
GQuoted in 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. §2251.
4 8 WIGMORE, Op.
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"This [privilege] might be lost and justice still be done ...
No doubt there would remain the need to give protection against
torture, physical or mental. Justice, however, would not perish
if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly
inquiry."7
The language was that of Justice Cardozo. Justices Hughes, Stone,
Brandeis, Roberts and Black, all of whom have deserved reputations
for devotion to civil liberty, concurred.
This background of torture in connection with the Fifth Amendment is not irrelevant to its use in non-criminal proceedings. The
privilege, both historically and rationally, is a safeguard against abuses
that would otherwise develop in the detection and prosecution of crime.
As we all know, legal principles are construed in relation to their
rationale. Employers and legislative committees do not use and do not
have available for use the apparatus of torture. Although employees
and witnesses before congressional committees may have unpleasant
things-such as social ostracism, loss of a job, upsetting one's friends
-happen to them as a result of what they say, or of their silence, it has
at no time been suggested that the unpleasant thing that was going to
happen would be torture. We must therefore realize that the primary
justification for the privilege does not apply to non-criminal proceedings and turn to other considerations.
Current controversy over the Fifth Amendment revolves about its
relationship with two general principles of the law of evidence.
First of these is what Wigmore calls the "duty to give what evidence one is capable of giving."
Lord Hardwicke put it this way: "The public has a right to every
man's evidence." 9
Chief Justice Marshall, at the trial of Aaron Burr, referred to "the
principle which entitles the United States to the testimony of every
citizen."' 10
This duty is essential to the orderly functioning of society. The
right of subpoena, that is the right to require other people to give evidence is fundamental not only to the welfare of the state but to the protection of the citizen. Indeed the defendant's right of compulsory
process in criminal trials, that is, the right of subpoena is a provision
of the Bill of Rights-in Article Six. Wigmore has said:
"This contribution (that is, the duty to testify) is not to be
regarded as a gratuity, or a courtesy, or an ill-requited favor.
It is a duty, not to be grudged or evaded. Whoever is impelled
7Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-6 (1937).

88

WIGMORE, Op.

cit. §2192.

9 XII Cobbett's ParliamentaryHistory, 693.
20 United States v. Aaron Burr, In Re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (C.C. D. Va.
1807).
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to evade or resent it should retire from the society of organized
and civilized communities, and become a hermit. He who will
live 1by society must let society live by him, when it requires
to.",'

Obviously the Fifth Amendment conflicts with this duty. Fifteen
years ago, that is, before the effort to expose Soviet fifth column
infiltration of the organizational life of our country had gained public
attention, one would have said that whatever difficulties this conflict
presented had been resolved. That resolution had been this: When
one enjoyed some special benefit or grant from the state, such as employment or a corporate charter or a license, either the Fifth Amendment did not apply at all, or if it did apply, the assertion of the Amendment automatically deprived or could constitutionally be made automatically to deprive, the witness who asserted it of his benefit or grant.
Typical of the first situation is the case of Wilson v. United States,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1911.12 The Court there held that

because a corporation existed by virtue of special license, a charter
granted by the state in its discretion, the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to its papers. A corporate officer could therefore be required to produce and identify corporate papers even if they
incriminated him. A recent illustration of the doctrine is United States
v. Field, decided by the Federal Court of Appeals in New York."1
That case concerned a surety on a bail bond. The criminal defendants
who were bailed became fugitives from justice after their convictions
were affirmed, and the government was attempting to locate them. It
questioned Field, the surety on the bond. It was held that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply "questions directly pertinent to the whereabouts of the fugitives or to clues to trace down their whereabouts."
The Court pointed out that "doctors must report deaths and their
causes, druggists must show their prescription lists . . .motor vehicle

operators must report details of collisions on highways."' 14 And doctors
who don't report deaths, druggists who don't show their prescription
lists and motor vehicle operators who don't report details of collisions
on the highways are not only punished directly for their failure to do
so, but in addition are deprived of the licenses by which they are entitled to act as doctors, druggists and motor vehicle operators respectively.
Typical of the second situation-that is, where the holder of the
benefit is permitted the use of the privilege against self-incrimination
but denied further enjoyment of the benefit is Christal v. San Fran1' Supra, note 8.
12 221 U.S. 361.
13 192 F.2d 92 (1951).
1Ibid. at p. 100.
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casco, decided in 1939.15 There several policemen invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination and the Commissioner of Police dismissed
them from the force. They appealed to the courts, who sustained the
Commissioner, saying:
"Duty required them to answer. Privilege permitted them
to refuse to answer. They chose to exercise the privilege but
the exercise of such privilege was wholly inconsistent with
their duty as police officers."
An Illinois decision, more recent, upheld the discharge of a policeman wijo invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. The Illinois
court held that use of the privilege was "conduct unbecoming an
officer" of the police department of the City of Chicago. 6
These and similar cases held that public employment could be terminated upon an invocation of the privilege.
In New York the courts at one time refused to sustain discharges
from public employment by reason of invocation of the privilege. In
consequence, during the Seabury investigation of municipal corruption in New York City some twenty-five years ago the public was
treated to the spectacle of numerous officeholders refusing to answer
questions on the ground of self-incrimination. Subsequently both the
Charter of the City of New York and the Constitution of the State of
New York were amended to provide that officeholders who invoked
the privilege should automatically lose their jobs. The validity of
these provisions was sustained by our New York courts.' 7
Similarly it is held that a bankrupt who invokes the Fifth Amendment will be denied a discharge from his debts. Discharge is, of
course, a special benefit granted by the Government, but subject to
conditions. One of those conditions is that the bankrupt answer all
proper questions by his creditors. If he fails to do so, whether he
rests his refusal on the Fifth Amendment or any other ground, he is
denied his discharge' 8
As to lawyers, the Supreme Court of Florida recently held that
invocation of the Fifth Amendment was not ground for disbarment.' 9
Dean Griswold approves the Florida decision. I confess that I must
disagree. If doctors, druggists, motor vehicle operators, corporation
officers must answer questions or lose their licenses, I see no reason
why lawyers should not be held to an equal standard. If invocation of
15 33 Cal.App. 564, 92 P.2d 416.
Ill.App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949).
17 CHARTER §903. In Re Goldway, 178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1942) ; In Re
16 339

Shlakman, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1953); In Re Delehanty, 304 N.Y.
727, 108 N.E.2d 46 (1952) ; N.Y. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 6. Carteline v. McClellan,
282 N.Y. 766, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940).
Is In Re Dresser, 146 Fed. 483 (2nd Cir. 1906) ; In Re Weinrab, 153 Fed. 363 (2nd
Cir. 1907) ; Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949).
29 82 So.2d 657 (1955).
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the privilege is conduct unbecoming a police officer of the City of
Chicago, in my opinion it is conduct unbecoming a lawyer. I think
lawyers are-or should be-as high in the scale of social conduct as
Chicago policemen.
I noted some time back that current controversy over the Fifth
Amendment revolved about its relationship with two general principles
of the law of evidence, and that the first was "the duty to give what
evidence one was capable of giving." The other principle is that
silence gives rise to an adverse inference. Of course the precise
inference depends upon the circumstances. As the circumstances vary
infinitely, the short way of putting the deduction to be drawn when a
witness is silent is to say that it is adverse, against the witness.2 0 Nowadays it is suggested that somehow or other it is unconstitutional or
disloyal to the Founding Fathers to conclude that when a witness
refuses to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds he is guilty of the act
concerning which he is silent. Let us examine that proposition.
The adverse inference ordinarily drawn from silence-I am getting
away for the moment from Fifth Amendment silence-is one of the
most powerful inferences, if not the most powerful inference, in
human affairs. Undoubtedly we have all experienced such silence in
both directions. That is, I am sure, each of us has-I know I havehad occasion to be silent on some subject because if he spoke what
he said would injure him in some way. And I am also sure that we
have noticed the silence of others and have construed it to mean that
whatever that other person had to say on the subject in question
would, if he said it, be used against him.
The decisions of the courts reflect and enforce this inference. Lord
Mansfield said:
"It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to
have produced and in the power of the other to have contradicted." 21
There are countless illustrations of the application of this principle
in judicial decisions. In my article on the Fifth Amendment I cited
numerous illustrations ;22 I could readily have cited many more.
Now there are those who would have us believe that although
silence in the usual situation gives rise to an adverse inference, there
is something about constitutionally-protected silence which requires
a different result. That is, if a witness simply refuses to answer a
question, is mute, we can draw an adverse inference, but if he says,
20 "Silence under accusation shows guilt, unless under the circumstances a reply

was not to be expected." Hutchins, Some Observationson the Law of Evidence
-Consciousness of Guilt," 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 725, 728 (1929).

21 Blotch v. Archer, Cowp. 55 (tKB. 1745).
22 Op. cit.,
supra,note 5 at pp. 38-42.
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"The reason I am silent is because an answer would incriminate me,"
then we cannot draw that adverse inference. I do not agree.
It is true that the laws of many of the states forbid, in criminal
proceedings, an adverse inference if the defen'ttnt does not testify,
but the rule is by no means universal even in criminal cases. 23 In

Ohio, for instance, where Dean Griswold was brought up and went
to college, the Constitution expressly provides that the jury may draw
such inference as it sees fit from the failure of the defendant in a
criminal case to testify on his own behalf, and that in summation the
prosecution may comment on this silence of the defendant. I don't
think there is any lack of constitutional liberty in Ohio and I imagine
that Dean Griswold, who has had better opportunities for observation,
agrees with me. Similar constitutional or statutory provisions exist
in a number of other states including California, New Jersey and
Vermont. In other states, such as Connecticut, and in Great Britain,
more or less the same result has been reached by judicial decision.
I have alluded to the fact that in many states the rule against the
adverse inference from the silence of a defendant in a criminal case
existed by reason of statutes. These statutes were adopted in the
middle of the nineteenth century when the states made defendants
in criminal cases competent witnesses in their own behalf. Previously
they had been like the parties litigant in civil cases, neither compellable
nor eligible to testify. In that era the leading treatise on the Law of
Evidence was Greenleaf on Evidence. It ranked with Wigmore
on Evidence today. Professor Greenleaf was Professor of Evidence
at the Harvard Law School. The comment in Greenleaf on Evidence
on these laws against adverse inference was as follows:
"It may be doubted whether a statute which prohibits any
such inference is not nugatory as contrary to the human mind.
A statute that upon proof that the sun was shining, no inference that it was light should be drawn by the jury, if not against
24
the constitution of a State, is against the nature of things."
Let us now turn to non-criminal proceedings. It is a general rule,
with, I believe, only negligible exceptions, that an adverse inference
follows from an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. The question
may arise in any of a number of ways. In a contract case, such as
Andrews v. Frye, a decision of the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts, there may be a question of the legality of the contract.
This was an action to collect the purchase price on the sale of a
quantity of intoxicating liquor. The sale had been made in the State
of Maine at a time when the laws of that state forbade the sale of
23 The statutes are collected at 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. §2272, footnote 2.
24 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (14th Ed. 1883) §451, footnote (c).
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liquor except under license. The defense was that the agreement was
void because illegal.
At the trial, to quote from the opinion,
"One of the plaintiffs, having offered himself as a witness in
their behalf, was asked by the defendants on cross-examination
whether the plaintiffs had a license to sell intoxicating liquors,
and declined to answer upon the ground that it might have a
tendency to criminate himself ...
"This refusal to answer, like any other refusal to produce evidence in his own power, was competent evidence against him
and his partner ...
"The ruling of the superior court, that the defendants had not
offered sufficient evidence to prove that the sale was in violation
of the laws of the state of Maine, was therefore erroneous,
because it withdrew from the jury a matter which was proper
for their consideration, and upon which they would have been
warranted by law in finding that the defendants had sustained
the burden resting upon them of proving that the sale was
illegal."2 5
Or as in United States v. Mammoth Oil Company, the government may demand a forfeiture on the claim that a grant had been
induced by bribery. There the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit
said, in part:
"Why is silence the answer of a former cabinet officer to the
charge of corruption? Why is silence the only reply of Sinclair,
a man of large business affairs, to the charge of bribing an
official of his government? Why is the plea of self-incrimination--one not resorted to by honest men-the refuge of Fall's
son-in-law, Everhart ?"
26
And the Court upheld the Government's demand for forfeiture.
Or the question may be what opinion the public may draw. In
Commonwealth v. Smith, a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, in which it appeared that at one time the defendant
had invoked the privilege, the Court said:
"The Constitution and laws do not and could not assume to say
that no unfavorable private opinion should be formed.

' 27

On occasion a proceeding to remove a public official may involve
charges of criminal misconduct. Commonwealth v. Pelletier, also a
25

26

27

104 Mass. 234, 237 (1870). The cases on the inferences to be drawn from invocation of the privilege are collected in West Reporting Company Digests
under "Witnesses" key number 309.
14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926). In this case the District Court engaged in a
number of speculations satisfactory to it why the witnesses might have been
silent consistently with innocence. 5 F.2d 330, 348 (D. Wyo. 1925). The Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court.
163 Mass. 411, 430 (1896). Mr. Justice Holmes, later of the United States
Supreme Court and highly regarded for his devotion to civil liberty, was at
that time a member of the Massachusetts court and concurred in this language.
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Massachusetts decision, was such a case. The official failed to testify.
The Court removed him and said, in part:
"Instant impulse, spontaneous anxiety and deep yearning to
repel charges thus impugning his honor would be expected from
an innocent man. Refusal to testify himself or to call available
witnesses in his own behalf under such circumstances warrants
inferences unfavorable to the respondent. It is conduct in the
nature of an admission. It is evidence against him. This
principle of law has long been established and constantly applied. The reason is that it is an attribute of human nature to
resent such imputations. In the face of such accusations, men
commonly do not remain mute but voice their denial with earnestness, if '2they can do so with honesty. Culpability alone seals
their lips.' 1
A somewhat related point arises in criminal prosecutions in which
the defendant, after invoking the privilege in the early stages of the
case, eventually waives it and takes the stand on his own behalf. It
is held that his taking advantage of the privilege may be used against
him in cross-examination, and made the subject of adverse comment
in the prosecution's summation. Raffel v. United States, a decision of
the United States Supreme Court,29 is the leading case on this point.
Now in considering the adverse inference drawn from silence a
distinction is to be made from silence in the proceeding itself and
silence on an earlier occasion when there was an opportunity to speak.
Let me illustrate. Let us assume a non-criminal proceeding. An accusation is made and not answered. The trier of facts, whether a jury,
a judge sitting without a jury, or an administrative board or committee, is not only permitted but required to draw an adverse inference
in making the decision in that proceeding.
Or it may develop in the course of a proceeding that on some
earlier occasion the party was accused and did not answer, as in the
Raffel type of case. Then the party should have an opportunity to
explain his former silence. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Smith,
the Massachusetts case to which I have already referred, 30 it developed
that in an investigation of alleged bribery, the defendant, an alderman,
had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination before the Grand
Jury. Later he was indicted for accepting bribes. He testified in his
own defense, and the prosecution, over the objection of his counsel,
brought out on cross-examination that he had pleaded the privilege
before the Grand Jury. The alderman was convicted, but took an
Mass. 264, 316, 134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922).
29271 U.S. 494 (1926). To the same effect are: McKee v. People, 72 Colo. 55,
209 Pac. 632 (1922); People v. Marcus, 235 App.Div. 397 (N.Y. 1932); Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, note 27; Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F.2d 652
(D.C. Cir. 1937).
30 Supra, note 27.
28240
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appeal alleging that the trial court had committed error in permitting
this cross-examination. The Supreme Judicial Court said:
"The defendant... now says he is innocent but that he would
not answer lest he might criminate himself. This fact though
open to explanation has some tendency to throw a doubt upon
the truth of his present testimony." 3'
Similarly, to apply that rule to the present situation, I think that
when a teacher is silent in a proceeding directly related to his tenure
of office, the board or committee in charge of the matter should draw
an adverse inference from that silence. On the other hand, if a teacher
employed by a private institution, invokes the privilege before some
other body, such as a congressional committee, he should have an
opportunity to explain. But his explanation, from my point of view,
would have to be a good one. There are two such explanations commonly made, according to the newspapers, which to my mind are most
unpersuasive. If I were the employer, or on the board or committee of
an employing institution, I would not accept either of these explanations.
The first such explanation commonly given is that the teacher did
not want to cause his friends trouble or inconvience, and he knew
that if he admitted membership in the Communist party he would be
asked about his fellow members. The oath of the witness is: "I swear
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." The oath
is not, "I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth except in so far as in my opinion the truth will be inconvenient
or distressing to my friends." If those who believe that a witness
should not be required to inconvenience their friends would come forward with a proposal to revise the oath of the witness, the subject
could be publicly debated and if the proponents of such a revision
could persuade Congress and our legislatures, the refusal to give testimony inconveniencing friends would be made legitimate. I suspect
the reason that no such proposal has been made is that there is every
reason to believe that if it were made, it would be overwhelmingly
rejected by public opinion. If the duty of a witness were thus limited,
the right of subpoena would become virtually worthless and trials
would become mere contests between one party and his friends on one
side, and the other party and his friends on the other. The so-called
"hostile witness," who is so often the most valuable witness in the
ascertainment of truth, would become unknown.
Now, as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out at the trial of Aaron
Burr, a witness commits perjury when he invokes the Fifth Amendment unless he genuinely believes that his answer would tend to show
31 Supra, note 27 at p. 432.
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him guilty of a crime. 3 2 A witness consciously invoking the Fifth
Amendment, not for his own protection, but for that of his friends
is therefore a perjurer, and I see no reason why he should not be
dealt with as such.
Lest this sound too ruthless let me say that, in my opinion, it is
unduly severe for a Congressional committee to call upon a former
Communist publicly to identify, against his will, his associates in the
party unless this former Communist has refused to give the information to the FBI. I am told by officials whom I believe, that as a practical matter, Congressional committees do not do so; that is, the only
former Communists called upon publicly against their will, to name
their party associates are people who have previously refused to give
this information to the FBI.
Let me also say that a witness, who out of sincere principle refused to testify before a Congressional committee, without invoking
the Fifth Amendment and took the consequences, would command
my respect although I would disagree with him. But I have no sympathy for the witness who perjuriously misuses the Fifth Amendment
in order to avoid a duty required of witnesses for four hundred years,
viz., the duty to tell "the whole truth."
A second explanation of use of the Fifth Amendment, frequently
made according to the press, is that the witness was frightened by
Kleig lights and the presence of newspaper men, and invoked the
Amendment in a desperate effort to protect himself, although he was
guilty of no crime. Sympathizers with this explanation argue, among
other things, that Congressmen browbeat witnesses, while in ordinary
court trials a judge is there to protect the witness from being bullied.
As a lawyer who has done a good deal of court work, I do not find
this explanation convincing, particularly when it is given by a person
of superior intelligence such as a lawyer or a teacher. In my younger
days, I was an Assistant District Attorney and often prosecuted in
criminal cases, and more recently I have been on the defense side in
personal injury cases. In this type of case the witnesses are markedly
less accustomed to the use of words, to occupying the spotlight, to
duels of wit, than the lawyers. The witnesses are, according to the
standards of measurement developed by our scientists, less intelligent
than the lawyers. In cross-examining the plaintiff in a personal injury
case, the defense lawyer uses every trick at his command to discredit
the witness. The plaintiff has his own lawyer there, to be sure, and a
judge is there, too, but they rarely intervene; at least in the New York
courts. The reason why the plaintiff's lawyer does not intervene is
because intervention would be interpreted by the jury as a sign of
32

25 Fed. Cas. 40.
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weakness. In New York it is understood that to win his case, the
plaintiff has got to be able to take care of himself against everything
that opposing counsel can say or ask. Do these workmen and clerks
crumble up under relentless questioning by resourceful lawyers?
Sometimes they do, but just as often, if not more often, it is the lawyer
who comes out second best. I regret- to say that I have had this sad
experience, despite the fact that I started out my cross-examination
with what seemed to be pretty formidable ammunition. And when such
witnesses do crumble up, it is because it has been shown that they are
lying. How can this ability of the witnesses to stand up to lawyers be
explained? The only explanation that I have ever heard, and the only
one persuasive to me, is that the witness who is telling the truth has
nothing to fear from the most brilliant examiner in the world.
Now when I was in Washington and my business took me to the
Capitol I dropped in occasionally on these Congressional investigations.
I never observed any discourtesy to a witness. I never heard an
examination that, for force and vigor, remotely resembled the crossexaminations that are routine in the New York courts. As far as discourtesy is concerned, on several occasions I heard witnesses be rude
to the committees. Moreover Congressional hearings are ordinarily
attended by the press, a substantial section of which has been most unfriendly to the investigations of treason and espionage. Discourtesy
to a witness would be immediately featured by the unfriendly section
of the press, as Congressmen are well aware.
Here I want to mention the junior Senator from Wisconsin. I do
so with reluctance because I find his name is more productive of
emotion than of that calm detachment which is necessary to successful
scholarship, and Dean Seitz has emphasized that this evening is to be
devoted to scholarship. I mention him only because, to do so, is necessary to my point. Everyone will agree, I assume, that no investigating
Congressman has been more severely criticized than Senator McCarthy. You will all recall that in the summer of 1954 resolutions to
censure him were introduced in the Senate. No one can read the
resolutions of censure without being impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive analysis of Senator McCarthy's record that had been made
by his political adversaries-as, of course, they had every right to do.33
Now Senator McCarthy had up to that time examined over 1400
witnesses as chairman of the Government Operations Committee. Of
the forty-odd counts in the censure resolutions only one charged discourtesy to a witness-the so-called Zwicker count. And even the
Zwicker count, although sustained by the Watkins Committee 34 was
3Hearings before a Select Committee to study Censure Charges, U.S. Senate,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to the order on S. Res. 301, pp. 2-8.
34 Sa-.REP. No. 2508, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 61.
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eventually rejected by the full Senate, although Senator McCarthy
was censured on other grounds. 35 Now if this most controversial
investigator, who examined 1400 witnesses, could be accused of discourtesy to only a single witness by painstaking and bitter political
opponents, and if that single accusation was not upheld by a majority
vote of a hostile Senate, I would be extremely skeptical, especially in
the light of my own observations, about the excuse made by a lawyer
or professor that he invoked the Fifth Amendment because of intimidation by a Congressional committee.
I regard the ordinary lawyer or professor as of, if not equal, intelligence, at least comparable intelligence with that of a Congressman.
If workmen and clerks who tell the truth can hold their own with
resourceful and experienced lawyers in courtroom cross-examinations
with few holds barred, I think a lawyer or professor should be able to
hold his own with a Congressman in a Congressional investigation.

REc. 16370, 16380-16381, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. The Zwicker count was
Section 2 of the resolution of censure as reported by the Watkins Committee.
The rejection of the Zwicker count took the form of the substitution of a
new and different Section 2 by which Senator McCarthy was censured for remarks criticizing the Watkins Committee. The motion to substitute was offered
by Senator Bennett at p. 16370 and adopted by the Senate at pp. 16380-16381.

35 100 CONG.

